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ParentAnd Child
RESPONSIBILITY OF ADULT CHILD FOR THE SUPPORT OF NEEDY PARENTS

Introduction
The steady march toward industrialization and urbanization has overturned what were once firmly established societal relationships - one of
the most noticeable being that of the adult child to his parents. Sociologists decry the destructive effect which modern industrial society has had
upon duties once traditionally owed by the child to his parents in their
later years.' When our population was predominantly rural,2 it was customary for aged parents to live with their children; there was usually
adequate room, and there were always tasks which an elderly person could
easily and contentedly perform.3 Such is no longer the case. The population shift to the cities has confined most workers to cramped quarters
with the prospect of a future which lacks the agrarian security of old,
and forced them to depend solely upon cash earnings for day-to-day
needs. The victim of this particular social transition is the elderly parent,
who has been forced to live independently, relying for his existence, like
his children, solely on cash income.
The number of these aged persons is growing constantly, as medical
science extends human life expectancy. According to one survey, the
number of persons over the age of 65 is increasing at the rate of 1,000
4
a day, and today this age group is four times as large as it was in 1900.
Another survey reports that while there were only three million persons
over the age of 65 in 1900 (one twenty-fifth of the total population),
there are over thirteen million today (one twelfth of the total population),
and it is estimated that by 1975 this group will constitute one half of the
adult population.5
The problem of supporting such great numbers of people who have
outlived their most productive years becomes acute when it is considered
that their adult children, who are trying to advance in a society that looks
upon accumulation of material goods as the ultimate standard of success,
have ignored or forgotten their moral obligation to provide for the support and maintenance of their parents.
This moral obligation was not always so neglected. In fact, so widely
was it recognized that at early common law there was no legal duty for
an adult child to support his needy parents; 6 it was believed unnecessary
to impose an artificial duty when the true duty was readily recognized
and accepted by the great majority of people. However, since there have
1

WICKENDEN, THE NEEDs oF OLDER PEOPLE 4, 5 (1953).

2 The census of 1920 was the last to show that a majority of the population
were self-employed. Id. at 4, 5.

3 Ibid.
4 BoND, OUR NEEDY AGED xiii (1954).
5 WICKENDEN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 7.
6 In re Fitzwater's Guardianship, 69 F. Supp. 866 (D.C. 1947); Rutecki v.
Lukaszewski, 273 App. Div. 638, 79 N.Y.S.2d 341 (4th Dept 1948); 67 C.J.S., Parent
and Child § 24 (1950).
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been deviates from moral duties in every society, it was found necessary
at the beginning of the 17th century to give legal recognition to this duty
of support. Accordingly, in 1601 there was enacted, for the relief of the

poors an act rendering the "father, grandfather, mother, grandmother,
husband or child" responsible for the relief and maintenance "of a poor,
old, blind, lame or impotent person." Thus was taken the first legal step
to force a child to comply with his nature, a step which caused an English
court to make the shameful admission that:
By the law of nature a man was bound to take care of his own father and
mother; but there being no temporal obligation to enforce that law of nature,
it was found necessary to establish it by Act of Parliament... 8

It was unfortunate that Parliament had to take over enforcement of a
duty grounded in human nature, but this situation creates an even greater
problem today because of the ever increasing number of aged parents and
the ever increasing multitude of able but laggard children. The English
solution has been utilized by thirty-six jurisdictions.9 Seventeen jurisdictions, on the other hand, provide for no legal enforcement of this duty,
leaving it solely to the child's conscience.1 0
The Statutes and Their Interpretation
The statute itself, called variously the "Pauper's Statute," the "Poor
Law" or the "Relatives Responsibility Statute," is basically the same in
all states providing for such relief. The essential provisions are that the
person to be aided be in "need"11 and that the person required to give
aid be of sufficient financial "ability" to so contribute. 12 Usually relatives
7 Act for the Relief of the Poor, 1601, 43 ELz, 2, § 7.
8 Rex v. Munden, 1 Strange 190, 93 Eng. Rep. 465 (1795).
9 ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 44, § 8 (1940); ALASKA CowP. LAws ANN. § 51-2-22
(1949); CAL. WELFAPE & INST'Ns CODE ANN. § 2181 (West 1956) and CAL. PEN.
CODE ANN. § 270 (c) (West 1955); COLO. Rnv. STAT. ANN. § 36-10-7 (1953);
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1444d (Supp. 1955); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 501 (a)
(Supp. 1956); D.C. CODE ANN. § 46-211 (1951); GA. CODE ANN. § 99-627 (1955);
GuAm Civ. CODE § 206 (1953); HAwAn REv. LAws § 12290 (1945); IDAHO CODE
AN. § 32-1002 (1947); ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 23, § 436-12 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1956);
IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-3001 (Bums Supp. 1955); IowA CODE ANN. § 252.2 (1949);
Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 405.080 (Baldwin 1955); LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 229 (West
1952); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. c. 94, § 20 (1954); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 112
(Supp. 1956); MAss. ANN. LAws c. 117, § 6 (1949); Mic. STAT. ANN. § 16.122
(Supp. 1955); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 261.01 (1947); Miss. CODE ANN. § 7357 (1942);
MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § § 71.233, 71.235 (1947); NEB. REv. STAT. § 68-101
(1943); N.H. Rev. STAT. ANN. § § 167.2, 167.3 (1955); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 44:1-140
(1940); 'N.Y. Soc. WEL. LAw § 101 (Supp. 1956); N.D. REv. CODE § 50-0703
(1943); Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2901.40 (Page Supp. 1956); ORE. R v. STAT. §
411.425 (1955); PA. STAT. ANN. fit. 62, § 1973 (a) (Purdon Supp. 1956); R.I. GEN.
LAws c. 69, § 5 (1938); VT. REv. STAT. § 7129 (1947); VA. CODE AiN. § 20-88
(Supp. 1956); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 626 (150) (1955); Wis. STAT. § 52.01 (1)
(1955).
10 Ariz., Ark., Fla., Kan., Mo., Nev., N.M., N.C., Okla., P.R., S.C., S.D., Tenn.,
Tex., Utah, Wash., Wyo.
11 People v. Hill, 163 M11.
186, 46 N.E. 746 (1896).
12

Without a provision that the responsible party have the ability to contribute

to the needy parent's support, the statute would probably be held unconstitutional.
See Mallatt v Luihn, 206 Ore. 678, 294 P.2d 871, 877 (1956) (dictum).
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other than children are included, some statutes specifically naming parents and grandparents along with children, while others include all close
relatives in general.
As long as the statute includes only these provisions it will be upheld
against claims of constitutional infringement. This was established in the
leading case of People v. Hill,'3 where the court espoused both the object
of the statute14 and the means set out to enforce it - by complaint of
the state's attorney.
A thorough understanding of the statute demands a closer look at the
basic requirements - "need" and "ability"; it is from these terms that
the statute derives its impact, or lack of impact, since the interpretation
of these words determines the effectiveness of the statute. There is a clear
division of authority on this statutory interpretation. Many courts cling
to the theory that since the statutes are in derogation of the common law,
they are to be strictly construed. 15 Others will look to the statute's remedial nature and construe it liberally.' 6 Indeed, the conflict exists even
between courts of the same state. In 1939 one New York court stated:
A statute having for its object the relieving of the general public of liability
for the support or maintenance of an unfortunate individual by one bound
by at least a moral obligation to supply such support and maintenance,

should be more liberally construed.... 17
Yet five years later another New York court held the identical statute
required a strict construction.' 8 One state has undertaken to resolve the
confusion by expressly providing in the statute the necessity for a liberal
construction. 19
As a general rule it is discretionary with the particular court to determine if the "need" exists in any given case. 20 It has been held that a person can be in "need" even though he is working, 21 or is receiving federal
social security benefits, 2 2 or is already receiving contributions from a

child.23 Whether holding an interest in real property will automatically

163 Ill. 186, 46 N.E. 796 (1896).
14 "The object of both the statute of Elizabeth and of our existing statute is to
protect the public from loss occasioned by neglect of a moral or natural duty imposed
on individuals, and to do this by transforming the imperfect moral duty into a
statutory and legal liability." Id. at 798.
15 County Commissioners v. Kohrell, 100 Colo. 445, 68 P.2d 32 (1937); In re
Morrissey's Estate, 183 Misc. 530, 49 N.Y.S.2d 464 (Surr. Ct. 1944); Commonwealth
v. Ruckle, 1 Pa. D.&C. 2d 51 (1954); Spies v. Peterson, 271 Wis. 505. 74 N.W.2d
148 (1956).
16 Rogers v. Kinnie, 134 Conn. 58, 54 A.2d 487 (1947); In re Garrison, 171
Misc. 983, 14 N.Y.S.2d 803 (County Ct. 1939); In re Wright's Estate. 172 Misc.
215, 14 N.Y.S.2d 953 (Surr. Ct. 1939).
17 In re Wright's Estate, supra note 16 at 955.
18 In re Morissey's Estate, 183 Misc. 530, 49 N.Y.S.2d 464 (Surr. Ct. 1944).
19 CAL. WELFARE & INST'NS CODE ANN. § 2003 (West 1956).
20 Commonwealth v. Campbell, 180 Pa. Super, 581, 119 A.2d 816 (1956).
21 Rogers v. Kinnie, 134 Conn. 58, 54 A.2d 487 (1947). The court remarked
that there was no necessity for the elderly person to stop working before bringing
action, for such would only serve to make him more destitute.
22 Commonwealth v. Kotzker, 179 Pa. Super. 521, 118 A.2d 271 (1955).
23 County of San Bernardino v. Simmons, 46 Cal. 2d 394, 296 P.2d 329 (1956).
13
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remove one from the roll of the "needy" is a question that has been
answered both ways.24 In Commonwealth v. Hallman,2 5 "needy" was explained as meaning "destitute of means of comfortable subsistence"; thus
the parent was allowed to keep the property to avoid becoming a public
ward, and yet remain eligible to bring action for support against able
children. But it has been decided that before an aged person can sue as
a pauper under the statute, he must have no available means of support
and must be in such dire straits that if the children or other relatives fail
to contribute to his support he will be eligible for assistance as a public
ward. 26 The factors which the welfare agencies or courts will consider in
determining "need" vary from state to state:
(Since) each State defines for itself who is a "needy" person... the States
differ widely in the types of items that they recognize as necessary and in
the amounts established as the costs of these items. Similarly, considerable
variation occurs in the limits that States establish on the 'amounts of property or other resources27that an individual may retain and still receive assistance
as a needy person.
Of course, items such as food, clothing, and shelter, are always considered
necessary, as are generally, fuel, utilities, and medical treatment. The
unity ends there, however, and it is extremely difficult to predict how a
court or agency will react to a given factual situation.2 8
Requirement of Ability
The question of "ability" is likewise dependent upon the facts of each
case as determined by the court or welfare agency, although many states,
in an effort to escape from this case-to-case approach have included contribution scales in their statutes. 29 In some states, local agencies utilize
income tax returns as a static and conclusive means of determining "ability."' o This method was upheld recently in Oregon despite a vehement
attack on constitutional grounds to the effect that equal protection of the
laws was impaired by such a system since income was based on tax returns and a wealthy person with no taxable income would be exempt from
contributing to the support of a needy parent.31 Another common device
is the establishment of a "base sum" minimum standard. An income below
such sum is deemed insufficient to require contribution as a matter of
Commonwealth v. Hallman, 3 Pa. D.&C. 2d 233 (1954).
Id. at 235
26 Tulin v. Tulin, 124 Conn. 518, 200 Atl. 819 (1938).
27 Hawkins, Recipients of Old Age Assistance: Income and Resources, Soc.
SEC. BULL., Apr., 1956, p.3.
28 For an excellent discussion of the many items involved, their amounts and
costs, see Hawkins, supra note 27,
24
25

29

E.g., CAL. WEL'FAR

& INST'Ns CODE ANN.

§

2181 (West 1956); GA. CoVa

ANN. § 99-626 (1955); MAss. ANN. LAws c. 118 A, § 2a (1949); MONT. Rlv.
CODs ANx. § 71.235 (1947); O.
Rav. STAT. § 411.425 (1955).
30 Epler, Old-Age Assistance; Determining Extent of Chilren's Ability to Support, Soc. SEc. BuLL., May, 1954, p. 7.
81 Mallatt v. Lulhn, 206 Ore. 678, 294 P.2d 871 (1956). Income tax return
upheld as a reasonable and easily administered standard.
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law.3 2 Still another common agency procedure for ascertaining "ability"
is the use of data on components and costs33of city workers' families, as
published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
A good example of the manner in which a local agency will approach
the problem of establishing "ability" is shown by the system utilized by
the Public Welfare Department of Lake County, Indiana. Aided by a
local citizens council, the agency set up a monthly income scale according
to which adult children fall into one of three categories. If the children are
in the "voluntary contribution" range, the agency will request aid for the
parent but will not employ legal pressure; if the children are in the "negotiation" range, the agency will request that a family budget be prepared and the difference between the budget and the income be contributed to the parent's support. If the child refuses the agency will refer the
case to the prosecuting attorney. If the child falls in the "support minia certain minimum
mum" range, the child will be requested to contribute
34
sum, and refusal will again result in prosecution.
While some courts are reluctant to disturb the findings of local agencies
regarding the financial ability of the person in question, 35 generally the
courts have considered the question independently.3 6 As a result certain
principles have evolved. One is that a child is entitled not only to an income sufficient for his immediate needs, but also reasonable savings for
sickness and for his own old age.37 Complementing this principle is the
general one that the court should be reluctant to make two paupers where
before there was only one. 3s The courts, then, will try to avoid the imposition of liability where to do so would surely impair the reasonable
savings of the child. On the other hand, it has been decided that a child
cannot escape liability simply on the ground that he is currently expanding
his business and needs all of his income for that purpose. 39 Such an argument is basically faulty since the taxpayers would bear the burden of
supporting the parent while the child moved ahead in the business world.
An extensive review of decided cases on the question of "ability"
would serve no useful purpose here since each case rests solely on its own
32 Epler, supra note 30.
33 Epler, supra note 30. This report contains an excellent disucssion of the actual
mechanics employed by the state agencies, a thorough treatment of which is beyond
the scope of this article.

34 Nierengarten, We Don't Believe in Relative Responsibility, 8 PUBLIC WELPARE,
103-104 (1950).
35 County of San Bernardino v. Simmons, 46 Cal.2d 394, 296 P.2d 329 (1956).
36 Commonwealth v. Ruckle, 1 Pa. D.&C.2d 51 (1954); Commonwealth v.

Campbell, 180 Pa. Super. 518, 119 A.2d 816 (1956); In re Diehle's Estate, 187 Misc.
196, 61 N.Y.S.2d 397 (Surr. Ct. 1946).
37 In re Diehle's Estate, supra note 36; In re Miller's Estate, 64 N.Y.S.2d 258
(Sur. Ct. 1946).
38 Commonwealth v. Ruckle, I Pa. D.&C. 2d 51,56 (1954,
39 Application of Machabee, 205 Misc. 85, 127 N.Y.S.2d 634 (County Ct. 1954);
see also, Application of Rickey, 126 N.Y.S.2d 261 (County Ct. 1953) (daughter
receiving monthly allotment from soldier husband deemed able to contribute to
mother's support when shown that she was in the process of purchasing a new car).
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merits. Even where the state has attempted to establish a stable definition
of "ability" by the employment of a contribution scale there is always
an implied condition that in cases of hardship the statutory scale will
not be conclusive. 40 Without
such a condition the statute would probably
41
be held unconstitutional.
Requirement of Relationship
There is also a conflict in the cases concerning the definition of "child"
as that term is used in the statutes. It is generally agreed that a son-in-law
is not liable for the support of his wife's parents.4 2 This rule was established by an early English case which pointed out that the statute for the
relief of the poor ". . . extended no farther than the law of nature went
before, and the law of nature does got reach this case." 43 Following this
precedent the courts have consistently retained a strict interpretation of
"child" and will not hold a son-in-law responsible unless the statute
specifically provides for such liability. 44 In a recent Pennsylvania decision
the court decried the lack of moral responsibility on the part of a husband
who would not pay the medical expenses of his mother-in-law, nor give
his wife more than enough money to cover household expenses, fearing
that she would give the excess to her mother;
yet the court felt compelled
45
to uphold the non-liability of the son-in-law.
In accord with this view it has been ruled that a report of the earnings
of the husband cannot be introduced into evidence in an action for
support brought against his wife by her parents, 4 6 nor can a court force
the division and sale of community property to provide the wife with the
necessary funds to support her parent,4 7 and where the husband and wife
are tenants by the entireties there is no duty on the husband to account
to the wife for half the rental value of the property as long as they are
both living on the property. 48 Moreover a daughter does not have
sufficient ability to support her parents if her only income is alimony
payments, for it has been decided that forcing support payments from
alimony would in effect, be compelling the ex-husband to support his
San Bernardino County v. McCall, 56 Cal. App. 99, 132 P.2d 65 (1942).
Mallatt v. Luihn, 206 Ore. 678, 294 P.2d 871, 877 (1956) (dictum).
Application of Dunaway, 174 Misc. 735, 22 N.Y.S.2d 69 (County Ct. 1940);
Alessandro v. Camelli, 47 N.Y.S.2d 237 (N.Y. Doam. Rel. Ct. 1944)
43 Rex v. Munden, 1 Strange 190, 93 Eng. Rep. 465 (1795).
44 Maricopa County v. Douglas, 69 Ariz. 35, 208 P.2d 646 (1949) (separate
judgment against a wife for the support of her mother could not be satisfied out
of the community property of the husband and wife); Grace v. Carpenter, 42 Cal.
App. 2d 301, 108 P.2d 701 (1941).
45 Commonwealth v. Goldman, 180 Pa. Super. 337, 119 A.2d 631 (1956). The
court did not require the wife to seek gainful employment because she had a primary
duty to remain at home and care for her infant daughter.
48 Grace v. Carpenter, 42 Cal. App.2d 301, 108 P.2d 701 (1941).
47 Maricopa County v. Douglas, 69 Ariz. 35, 208 P.2d 646 (1949); Grace v.
Carpenter, supra note 46.
48 Kullman v. Wyrtzen, 266 App. Div. 802, 41 N.Y.S.2d 682 (2d Dep't 1943).
40
41
42
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ex-mother-in-law, and if he was not liable for such support while he was
married he certainly should not be liable after the marriage is dissolved. 49
Since married daughters rarely have sufficient independent income to
qualify them for liability under the statute, the exemption of sons-in-law
virtually eliminates the possibility of recovering contributions from this
source. This interpretation seems sound, despite the apparent injustice
toward the wife's parents, for to hold otherwise would render the husband liable for two sets of parents, a burden which could prove extremely
burdensome. However, in at least one state there is currently a movement
to enforce liability against sons-in-law. 50
Whether an illegitimate child is liable for the support of his needy
parents is another question upon which the courts are divided. In Commonwealth v. Campagna,51 the court held that the terms "child,"
"children," and "parents" referred only to a legal relationship, and thus
an illegitimate child has no legal duty to support his paternal grandfather.
A New York court adopted the opposite conclusion on the ground that
state statutes had eliminated the distinction between illegitimate and
legitimate children. 52 However, five years later this decision was questioned in Castellani v. Castellani,53 where the court found no such
distinction in the statute that would put an illegitimate child on the same
level as a legitimate child and render him responsible for his parent's
support. The Louisiana Civil Code provides that an illegitimate child
owes reciprocal duties to his parents, and these duties are those established
by nature and humanity. 54 While the question at hand is not clearly
defined in the cases, it can be said with reasonable certainity that an
illegitimate child will generally not be responsible under the statute.
However, an adopted child is generally responsible for the support
of his needy foster parents, and the courts again consider only the legal
relationship involved in interpreting the statute. 55 Following this rationale
it seems clear that an adopted child will no longer be responsible to his
natural parents. 56

50

County of Contra Costa v. Lasky, 43 Cal.2d 506, 275 P.2d 452 (1954).
Chicago Daily Sun-Times, Mar. 27, 1957, p. 24, col. 1.

51
52

40 Pa. D.&C. 478 (1940).
Lee v. Smith, 161 Misc. 43, 291 N.Y.Supp. 47 (N.Y. Dom. Rel. Ct. 1936).

53

176 Misc. 763, 28 N.Y.S.2d 879 (N.Y. Dom. Rel. Ct. 1941), aff'd mem.

49

sub nom., Capaldo v. Capaldo, 263 App. Div. 984, 34 N.Y.S.2d 400 (1st Dep't 1942).
54

LA. Cirv. CODE ANN. art. 239 (West 1952).

Couteau v. Couteau, 192 Misc. 736, 77 N.Y.S.2d 113 (N.Y. Dom. Rel. Ct.
(decided under a
statutory construction act which provided that "child" included children by adoption).
56 See Betz v. Horr, 276 N.Y. 83, 11 N.E.2d 548 (1937). The natural father of
an adopted child was not liable for the child's support even though the adoptive
parent was destitute and the child was destined to become a ward of the state.
57 IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-3001 (Burns Supp. 1955) (Child not liable unless
supported by a parent up to age 16 if male and 17 if female); NJ. ANN. STAT.
§ 44.1-141 (Supp. 1956) (child not liable if deserted during minority); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 62 § 1973 (a) (Purdon Supp. 1956) (child not liable if abandoned for
ten year period during minority).
55

1948); Commonwealth v. Chiara, 60 Pa. D.&C. 547 (1947)
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By statutory enactment in three states a child is not liable to any parent
who has deserted or abondoned him. 5 r In New Jersey the effect of this
provision has been diluted by a 1951 decision which found that the
language of the statute was not met despite the fact that the father put the
child in a home at the age of twelve and failed to adequately support
him thereafter. 58 Opposed to this strict interpretation is a decision from
New York, where the statute has no abandonment provision, to the effect
that a father forfeited all moral claim for support from a daughter from
whom he had been separated for twenty-three years. 59
Right to Contribution
Where there is more than one child capable of supporting the parent
the child against whom the judgment is rendered may often recover pro
rata contributions from his able brothers or sisters.60 This is just, especially where the other children have requested that one particular child
undertake the support obligation. 61 An implied request may be found
where the other children are aware that one of their brothers or sisters is
supporting a parent. 62 Other cases hold that while a child who bestows
voluntary benefits upon his parents cannot recover reimbursement from
other children, a child who is coerced into doing so by force of law may
be permitted to recover contributions from his brothers or sisters.63 The
result of these decisions is seemingly based on some form of constructive
notice resulting from the legal compulsion-which notice is lacking where
the support is voluntary.
The trend would seem to be in favor of requiring contribution as
evidenced by the recent decision of Mallatt v. Luihn,64 which seriously
questioned the former leading California case, Garciav. Superior Court.65
The latter decision had stood as authority for the proposition that a
child could not join other children as co-defendants or require contribution from them, as his obligation was several and not joint under the
statute. Other indications of the trend are a recently enacted Delaware
statute6 6 requiring equal contribution from children and an Illinois
statute 67 to the effect that liability is to be assessed proportionately.
58 Slocum v. Krupy, 11 NJ. Super. 81, 77 A.2d 871 (1951).
59 In re Garrison, 171 Misc. 983, 14 N.Y.S.2d 803 (County Ct. 1939).
60 Mallatt v. Luihn, 206 Ore. 678, 294 P.2d 871 (1956).
61 Wyman v. Passmore, 146 Iowa 486, 125 N.W. 213 (1910). The court remarked, "There can be no doubt of the proposition that, where one of several
children undertakes to keep a parent at the request of others, those at whose
request the service is performed are under obligation to make reasonable compensation." 125 N.W. at 214.
62 See Shaver v. Brierton, 1 Il. App. 2d 192, 117 N.E.2d 298 (1954).
63 Manthey v. Schueler, 126 Minn. 87, 147 N.W. 824 (1914); Wood v. Wheat,
226 Ky. 762, 11 S.W.2d 916, 918 (1928) (dictum); Muse v. Muse, 215 La. 238, 40
So. 2d 21, 23 (1949) (dictum).
64 206 Ore. 678, 294 P.2d 871 (1956).
65 45 Cal. App. 2d 31, 113 P.2d 470 (1941).
66 DEL. CoD ANN. tit. 13, § 501 (a) (Supp. 1956).
67 ILL. STAT. Ar. tit. 23, § 436-12 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1956).
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ProperPartiesPlaintiff
When the parent brings the action himself, or the county on behalf of
the parent, there is generally present no problem aside from showing the
required "need" of the parent and "ability" of the child. The situation is
otherwise where the county or some third party who has contributed
support to the parent brings the action for reimbursement. The right of
the county to recover reimbursement from a child is based on the assumption that the child has the primary duty to support the "needy" parent,
and the county is only bound to give aid where the child fails in his
duty. 68 Such reimbursement action by the county has been held constitutional. 69 It has been reasoned in several cases that a quasi contract
exists between the child and the county.70 It has also been decided that
the county's right to reimbursement is a common law right and therefore
no statutory authorization is necessary. 71 Recovery by the county may be
72
allowed for future support payments as well as for past assistance.
This is the ordinary result under state statutes which provide for the
as the child
forfeiture of certain weekly or monthly sums for as7 long
3
refuses to contribute directly to the parent's support.
Of course the county can recover only if the child is shown to have the
sufficient financial ability required, and such ability must have existed at
the time the county furnished the aid. 74 Afteracquired property may not
be used as a basis for recovery.7 5 Nor will an action lie against the estate
of a son who had no sufficient ability at the time the county supplied the
aid.7 6 Conversely, if the child had the ability at the time of the grant he
county even though he does not have such ability
is responsible to the
77
at the time of trial.
An able child has been held liable to a private institution for support
furnished his parent. 7 8 In the absence of an express contract with the
68 Los Angeles County v. Frisbie, 19 Cal.2d 634, 122 P.2d 526 (1942); Mendelsohn v. Mendelsohn, 192 Misc. 1014, 80 N.Y.S.2d 913 (N.Y. Dom. Rel. Ct. 1948);
In re Garrison, 171 Misc. 983, 14 N.Y.S.2d 803 (County Ct. 1939); Mallatt v.
Luihn, 206 Ore. 678, 294 P.2d 871 (1956).
69 Maricopa County v. Douglas, 69 Ariz. 35, 208 P.2d 646 (1949); Mallatt v.
Luihm, supra note 68.
70 Tolley v. Maliswaski, 159 Misc. 89, 287 N.Y. Supp. 245 (Sup. Ct. 1936) (the
New York welfare law provided: "any public relief received . . . shall constitute an
implied contract."); In re Erny's Estate, 337 Pa. 542, 12 A.2d 333 (1940).
71 In re Reiver's Estate, 343 Pa. 137, 22 A.2d 655 (1941).
72 Los Angeles County v. Frisbie, 19 Cal. 2d 634, 122 P.2d 526 (1942).
73 E.g., ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 44, § 8 (1940); COLO. RV. STAT. ANN. § 36-10-7
(1953); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 261.01 (1947); MISS. CODE ANN. § 7357 (1942).
74 Fuller v. Galeota, 271 App. Div. 155, 63 N.Y.S.2d 849, 852, (4th Dep't 1946)
(dictum).
75 Turnboo v. County of Santa Clara, 301 P.2d 992 (Cal. 1956).
76 In re Morrissey's Estate, 183 Misc. 530, 49 N.Y.S.2d 464 (Surr. Ct. 1944)
(son's estate consisted entirely of proceeds of life insurance).
77 Tolley v. Maliswaski, 159 Misc. 89, 287 N.Y. Supp. 245 (Sup. Ct. 1936).
78 Commonwealth v. Kotzker, 179 Pa. Super, 521, 118 A.2d 271 (1955). And
see HxwAn R V. LAwS §12290 (1945), which specifically provides that private
institutions can bring action against the child.
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county, the action of the third person must be against the relatives, and
not the county, except where the nursing aid furnished is of an emergency
character.7 9 However, a third person cannot recover from a child on the
ground that he assumed the contractual duty of the child, where there
is no statute permitting civil action against the child.80
Whether an undertaker can recover funeral expenses from a child is
another issue upon which there is no unanimity of authority. A 1948
New York case ruled that no legal obligation existed toward the undertaker, and refused reimbursement. 8 1 An earlier case from the same state
allowed recovery by an undertaker on the theory that the child had a
82
moral obligation to reimburse the undertaker.
Relationship of Other Compensatory Statutes
The use of the support statute is not confined solely to coercing the
able child into supporting his parents or reimbursing the county. It has
also affected cases involving actions under Wrongful Death, Workman's
Compensation, Dram Shop Acts and, more importantly, state Old Age
Assistance statutes.
A line of decisions under the Pennsylvania Workman's Compensation
Act serves as an illustration of the usual elements present in these actions.
It has been held that parents cannot sue as total dependents after the
death of a contributing son if they have other legally responsible children
to whom they may turn for support.88 In the workman's compensation
cases it has also been held that the earning capacity and legal obligation
of the surviving children to their parents are matters to be considered by
the compensation authorities before granting an award to the parents.8 4
If the children are too young or of insufficient ability, they have no legal
obligation to support the parent and,5 therefore, have not been considered
8
as a source for the parent's support.
To be dependent under workman's compensation statutes then, the
parent must be needy and the child able. What is the result if the parent
is only potentially needy or the child only potentially able? This is a
question that has arisen under the Wrongful Death and Dram Shop Acts.
Thi courts are agreed that where the child was already contributing to
the needy parent, damages for future support will be upheld on the basis
of the continuing legal obligation.8 6 However, where the need or ability
79 Miller v. Banner County, 127 Neb. 690, 256 N. W. 639 (1934); see Marshall
v. County of Nance, 163 Neb. 252, 79 N.W.2d 417 (1956).

80 Gardner v. Hines, 34 Ohio Op. 25, 68 N.E. 2d 397 (1946).
81 Rutecki v. Lukaszewski, 273 App. Div. 638, 79 N.Y.S.2d 341 (4th Dep't
1948).
82 In re Neville's Estate, 147 Misc. 171, 263 N.Y. Supp. 528 (Surr. Ct. 1933);
see In re Connolly's Estate, 88 Misc. 405, 150 N.Y. Supp. 559 (Surr. Ct. 1914.)
83 Mattis v. Arcadia Coal Co., 148 Pa. Super. 462, 25 A.2d 610 (1942).
84 Yurski v. Continental-Archbald Coal Co., 157 Pa. Super. 201, 42 A.2d 86
(1945).
85 Uber v. Bobo & Bango Coal Co., 157 Pa. Super. 412, 43 A.2d 385 (1945).
8 See New York Central R.R. v. Johnson, 234 Ind. 457, 127 N.E. 2d 603 (1955).
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is non-existent at the time of the injury, but recovery is sought solely on
the basis that it will arise at some future time, recovery will generally be
denied. 8 7 No legal obligation comes into existence until the parents are
actually in need of support.88 The same result was attained in a decision
under a Dram Shop Act, the court stating that potentiality of support
being necessary in the future is not an adequate ground for recovery
since the parent has to be indigent before the obligation arises.8 9
As a practical matter, the difficulty of proving future need on the part
of the parent or future ability on the part of the child nullifies any attempt
at recovery based upon the child's statutory duty toward his parents.
Thus the legal obligation is of little use in these situations and, indeed,
may even act as a detriment to the parents, since it may be used to
decrease the amount of benefits recoverable by them under workman's
compensation acts.
The advent of old age assistance has converted the statutory responsibility of children for needy parents into an extremely controversial
issue. 90 The basis for many a child's refusal to support his parents is a
belief that because his parents were taxpayers, the duty belongs to the
state.9 1 This attitude has led many agencies to avoid employing the
statutory machinery until all attempts to obtain voluntary support for the
parent have failed.92 Notwithstanding this hands-off attitude of the
agencies, the prevailing public opinion seems to be to the effect that the
primary responsibility rests with the children and that the government
should only step in with aid when the children are not able to perform
or simply refuse to do so under any circumstances. 93
This problem is more important now than ever before because of the
increased cost of old age assistance. Many people feel that strict enforcement of the statutes would remove a considerable number of present
recipients from the assistance rolls. 94 However, numerous agency directors
disagree with this premise, contending that the administrative difficulties,
plus the costs of carrying out court action against the children outweigh
any possible reductions in assistance payments that might result from
strict enforcement of the statute. 95 The Minnesota Committee on Aging
has stated the existing controversy quite succinctly:
The problem of securing support from legally responsible relatives is one
of the more puzzling aspects of meeting dependency among our aging. There

87 See Novak v. Chicago & Calumet Dist. Transit Co., 135 N.E.2d 1 (Ind.
1956); Simons v. Kidd, 73 S.D. 306, 42 N.W.2d 307 (1950).
88
Simons v. Kidd, supra note 87.
89 Robertson v. White, 11 111. App. 2d 177, 136 N.E.2d 550 (1956).
90 BOND, OUR NEEDY AaED 152, 153 (1954).
91 Nierengarten, We Don't Believe in Relative Responsibility, 8 PUBLIC WELFARE

103 (1950).
92 Laitinen, Our Program of Relative Responsibility, 6 PUBLIc WELFARE 204
(1948). And see Epler, Old Age Assistance: Plan Provisions on Children's Responsibility for Parents, Soc. SEc. BULL., April, 1954; CORSON & MCCONNELL,
ECONOMIC NEEDS OF OLDER PEOPLE 179 (1956).
93 BOND, OUR NEEDY AGED 153 (1954).
94 BOND, OUR NEEDY AGED 256, 352-55 (1954).
95 BOND, OUR NEEDY AGED 315, 354 (1954).

1957]

NOTES

119

are some assertions that if relatives responsibility provisions in the law were
strengthened or if the present regulations were more rigidly enforced, the
public economic burden of our aging population could be very substantially
reduced. There are others who hold that it is impossible, inadvisable or inequitable to try to enforce (them) at all, and that we should face reality and
drop the provisions entirely .... 96

Where such laws are strictly enforced it has been shown that great
savings result for the taxpayer. Cook County (Chicago), Illinois, which
strictly enforces the statute, has proportionately less persons over 65
drawing old age assistance than 75 other counties in Illinois. 9 7 Slightly
more than 10% of the people over 65 in Cook County receive old age
assistance, while Louisiana, which declines from strict enforcement of
its statute, has 60% of the same age group on relief.98 In San Bernardino
County, California, where the statute was enforced at the rate of four
cases a month according to a 1954 survey, it was discovered that the
administrative costs to the agency in bringing court action amounted to
approximately $1,250 for a five month period, while the contributions
received from the relatives in such actions during this same time amounted to $7,037.50.99 In the latter county strict enforcement is regarded by
county officials as the best means of being fair to relatives, accomplishing
a saving
for the taxpayers, and increasing the benefits to elderly per00
sons.

Another reason for strict enforcement of these statutes is the express
provision in many old age assistance statutes to the effect that assistance
will not be granted to needy old persons who have legally responsible
children, whether they are actually contributing or not. 101 In Illinois the
statute provides that the local supervisor of assistance may require a
needy person to request legal action against his children before he will
give him any financial assistance.' 0 2 Apparently these statutes are based
on the assumption that children will accept their duty if it becomes
evident that the state will not. 10a While this position may be justifiable in
many cases, it is not universally true and it seems doubtful that the
added incentive to the children outweighs the manifest hardship imposed
upon the parents.
96 Minn. Comm. on aging, Minnesota's Aging Citizens, Jan., 1953, p.62, 63
(quoted in Epler, Old Age Assistance: Plan Provisions on Children's Responsibility
for Parents, Soc. SEC. BuLL., April, 1954, p.12).
97 Chicago Daily Sun-Times, March 15, 1957, p.35, col. 1-2.
98 Ibid.
99 BOND, OuR NEEDY AGED 201 (1954).
100

Ibid.

101 ALASKA ComT. LAws ANN. § 51-2-23 (1949); CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 1601d
(Supp. 1955); DC CODE ANN. § 46-202 (1951); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 205.120 (7)
(Baldwin 1955); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 16.428 (Supp. 1955); NEB. REv. STAT. §
68.202 (4) (Supp. 1955); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 44.7-5(b) (Supp. 1956); N.D. REy.
CODE § 50-0703 (1943); Wis. STAT. § 49.22 (d) (1955).
102 ILL. ANN. STAT. tit. 23, § 436-12 (Smith Hurd Supp. 1956).
1Oa Epler, Old Age Assistance: Plan Provisions on Children's Responsibility for
Parents,Soc. SEC. BuLL., April, 1954.
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Conclusion
Undoubtedly, the idea of compelling an able child to maintain the
very persons who gave him life is a concept completely foreign to man's
nature and repugnant to many people. But despite human nature we are
faced with the increasingly difficult task of providing support for many
of the aged, whose own able children refuse to assist them. First given
legal recognition in the 17th century, the problem has reached alarmingly
serious proportions today; even more troublesome proportions are destined for the not too distant future.
It is submitted that the most effective remedy for the social lag in this
area, repugnant though it may be, is the strict enforcement of the relatives
responsibility statutes against all able children, the logical persons to
assume such burden of support. Widespread adoption of the UNIFORM
RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT has made this approach
more feasible than ever before. Enforcement of the statutes will not
supply the love that should accompany the bestowals, but at least it will
supply the bestowals. Though such grudgingly granted gifts will hardly
lead to harmonious family life, the end result-support of the parentswill alleviate the demands of a critical social problem.
Rigid enforcement of the statutory obligation will also result in savings
for the general public, since the state will then be relieved of a large part
of its burden in providing old age assistance; in view of an aging population increasing at a rate unheard of in the history of the world, the saving
to the state will be considerable.
Though strong arguments are posited to prove that the difficulties of
administration outweigh the benfits to be gained from strict enforcement,
experience has demonstrated that such is not the case. As the director of
one of the largest welfare departments in the country has stated:
There can be no question that when legally responsible relatives who are
financially able are required to contribute to the support of their parents,
and if the law is strictly enforced, then the amount of public aid expenditures for such purpose is greatly decreased.104

John P. Callahan

104 Letter from Raymond M. Hilliard, Director of the Cook County (Chicago)
Dep't of Welfare, to the Notre Dame Lawyer, March 28, 1957, on file in the Notre

Dame Law Library.

